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Abstract
Postwar European federalist efforts to encourage cooperation between traditionally hostile
countries ultimately gave birth to the European Union and its single currency. Today, the political
and economic institutions and structures that emerged from the process of European integration
confront the challenges posed by the recent Eurozone crisis. Europe’s survival demonstrates
resilience but does not evidence a transformation in the politically contested nature of European
economic and political union. This thesis asks why the thick regulatory framework and rules-based
nature of the Eurozone produced a suboptimal currency union. To answer this question, this thesis
draws on the two major theories of political economy, liberalism and socialism. An analysis of
these theories yields a better understanding of how the political and economic factors plaguing the
Eurozone interrelate. The absence of a state to accompany the Eurozone creates a fundamental
structural shortcoming responsible for the poor economic and political performance of the
currency union. However, both liberal and socialist critiques fall short in offering viable solutions
to ameliorate the persisting challenges plaguing the Eurozone. The employment of the two major
theories of political economy to interpret the threats facing the currency union reveals the utopian
ideals and political tasks accompanying liberal and socialist critiques. Understanding the political
and economic elements of the Eurozone crisis and how both theories grapple with the challenges
they present will prepare scholars of European political economy to offer appropriate solutions to
strengthen the political support for the currency union.

Acknowledgements
This thesis represents one moment in the much greater personal effort to understand how
capitalism and inequality shapes our lives and political consciousness. The accommodations
required in a capitalist system represent a gain, in the form of increased standards of living, and a
fundamental loss, in the form of abandoning egalitarian ideals. I first became interested in
European politics while studying at the University of Cambridge with Dr. Geoffrey Edwards. His
support in addition to the long essay on Marx’s conception of the political I completed with Dr.
Claire Grant, inspired this thesis. The labor performed to complete this thesis would not have been
possible without my parents, John and Sara Hendrickson, who have been the most ardent advocates
of my education. Dr. Ellen Kennedy kept me focused throughout this process and pushed me to
always consider alternative arguments. I appreciate her guidance and support. Lastly, I must thank
my dear friends who consistently provide me with love, critical conversation, and baked goods. I
am indebted to their thoughtful engagement. These people include the women of the Student Labor
Action Project, Alec Ward, and my housemates at the Burrow.

INTRODUCTION

Europe is in crisis. Since the peak years of the Eurozone financial crisis, the list of
Europe’s woes has only grown. Today, the existential threat facing the European Union seems
greater than ever. However, the progress of the last few years show signs of economic
improvement as well as moments of European harmony. The Eurozone recently demonstrated
trends in steady economic recovery and growth, and in the wake of recent terrorist attacks that
attempted to divide the continent, Europe and its leaders came together in public demonstrations
of solidarity.1 Unfortunately, these fleeting moments of economic calm and expressions of
European unity quickly fade when one remembers the underlying financial and political
challenges that persist.
In 1999, automated teller machines began dispensing the euro. Roughly ten years after
the establishment of the single currency, economic crisis revealed the weaknesses of Economic
and Monetary Union. In 2011 and 2012, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Cyprus
reached unsustainable debt to GDP ratios. Before the series of sovereign debt crises, the
Eurozone did not possess a lender of last resort policy. As members of a single currency union
subject to strict fiscal rules, indebted countries could not devalue their currencies to recover from
market collapse. Instead, in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, Euro-area countries, the European
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund put together last-minute packages to bail-out
the indebted states of the currency union. These packages proved politically tumultuous both in
wealthier member states transferring funds to poorer member states and within indebted
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countries living under the severe austerity measures contained in the terms of the bailout
agreements. Since the crisis, few take the future existence of the euro for granted.2
The 2012 Fiscal Compact Treaty introduced stricter fiscal rules and greater constraints on
national budget deficits with the hope that market collapse would not lead member states to
threaten leaving the currency union. These macro-economic measures, however, raise doubts
regarding the legitimacy of the European Union and its democratic accountability.3 One
European scholar contends that “the very rules-based nature of the improved system of
governance…makes the EU even more technocratic and less political than it was before…which
might please financial markets but which increases the distance between authorities and the real
economy.”4 It is a sad irony that the single currency created to unify the continent has resulted in
undermining the ability of its members to preserve Europe’s ancient cultural heritage. Today,
Italy maintains a public debt of 133% of GDP and Greece maintains a public debt of 179% of
GDP.5 The crisis burdened the two Eurozone countries that house the greatest symbols of
Europe’s past.
Throughout the European Union, right-wing populism has experienced increasing
electoral success since the Eurozone crisis. France’s National Front party led by Marine Le Pen
and Britain’s United Kingdom Independence Party respectively won 26% and 28% of the vote in
the 2014 European Parliament elections, marking an unprecedented populist victory since the
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establishment of the European Union.6 Within member countries’ parliaments, anti-euro and
anti-immigrant parties, including Greece’s Golden Dawn and the Netherlands’ Freedom Party,
have gained the support of an increasing number of voters. Right-wing populist parties capitalize
on feelings of insecurity and blame the Eurozone and foreigners for socioeconomic uncertainty.
Right-wing xenophobic and anti-Muslim attacks have only strengthened in the last year as 1.2
million refugees fleeing political turmoil and war abroad entered Europe.7 Greek shores alone
saw the arrival of 800,000 refugees in 2015.8 The migrant crisis provides fodder to European
political discontent.9 Even Germany, a country that had failed to see the rise of populist parties
over the past few years, is finally witnessing a surge in anti-immigrant protest voting. Six months
after Angela Merkel officially opened Germany’s borders to refugees, German state ballots cast
on March 13th unexpectedly favored Alternative for Germany, a three-year-old right-wing antirefugee party.10
In addition to these financial and migrant crises, Europe also confronts a newly
invigorated attack posed by Euro-skepticism. Britain will hold a national referendum on whether
to continue its European Union membership on June 23rd of this year. The March 12th print
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edition of The Economist declared that “Europeans are questioning their common identity more
intensely at any time since the second world war.”11 Even if Britain has always been an awkward
and Eurosceptic member of the Union, the possible end of its long-standing membership serves
as yet another reminder of Europe’s uncertain future. At the time when the need for a common
European identity proves greatest, the prospect of achieving such unity appears least viable.

Research Question

While these crises plaguing Europe arise from the challenges of recent events, they are
rooted in the political and economic oversights present from the EU’s beginning. The Maastricht
Treaty establishing the European Union and the single currency only secured passage after
national referendums in Ireland, France, and Denmark. The low turn-out in the Irish vote, the
narrow margin of victory in the French vote, and the Danish exceptions from the Treaty after its
second national referendum, dampened celebrations of the EU’s birth.
Nowhere is the disconnect between the initial vision of European federalists and presentday political and economic reality more apparent than in the instability of the Eurozone. This
thesis understands the Eurozone crisis as a function of the financial and political oversight in
establishing a currency union without a fiscal union. Even among proponents of the Eurozone
who predicted a crisis, “Euro-optimists [still] hope[d] that crisis [would] catalyze economic
liberalization, European solidarity, and perhaps even those steps of political unification that
historically have preceded, not followed, successful monetary unions.”12 Not surprisingly, the
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predictions of Euro-optimists did not come fruition and the crisis has certainly failed to inspire
any lasting wave of European unity. What seems odd, however, is the contrast between the
Eurozone’s fiscal rules and the currency union’s lackluster economic performance. Despite its
highly rules-based nature and thick regulatory framework, why does the Eurozone operate as a
suboptimal currency union?13
To answer this question, this thesis will examine liberal and socialist critiques of
European political economy. The overarching problem plaguing the Eurozone remains its
distance between macro-economic rules and the political outcomes they create. The Eurozone
crisis was not merely fiscal and monetary in nature. The crisis highlighted the fundamental
political weakness that afflicts the currency union. Thus, this thesis will rely on liberalism and
socialism as sociopolitical theories to analyze the Eurozone crisis as a dialectic of the political
and economic.

Argument

The Eurozone operates as a suboptimal currency union because it lacks a state. The
Eurozone’s statelessness is a structural deficiency reflected in the shortcomings of liberal and
socialist critiques. While liberal and socialist critiques identify the Eurozone’s statelessness as
the fundamental design flaw in the currency union, both theories fall short in their visions of the
European state the currency union so desperately requires. Liberal thought does not sufficiently
wrestle with the issues of political disaffection and social policy demands that a European state
would need to redress. Socialist solutions that call for a European social citizenship and the
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creation of a political body to reign in capital do not simultaneously ameliorate the deleterious
outcomes of market logic and address the non-economic political factors plaguing the currency
union. The necessity of a state and demos in Europe requires moving beyond the solutions
presented by liberalism and socialism thus far.

6

CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING THE EUROZONE AT ITS MOMENT OF
INCEPTION

Introduction

From the federalist dreams of Europe’s founding fathers, emerged a confederation of
member states that currently faces a democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis. To those still
chasing after the political dream of a United States of Europe, the present crisis represents the
potential failure of this vision. A return to the uneasy transitions of European integration proves
essential to understand the Eurozone at its moment of inception. European political integration
and its accompanying market ideology remain incomplete and reveal that the major questions of
the Cold War remain essentially unsettled – East versus West, communism versus capitalism.
The present-day outcomes of European integration poke holes in the victories that
followed the West’s Cold War triumph. George Kennan and Friedrich Hayek, who both
predicted the end of the Cold War, expressed concern over the nature of the West’s victory.
Kennan worried that the end of the Cold War did not reflect the merits of the Western side,
rather the other side simply collapsed.14 Hayek also cautioned that Western democracy only
prevailed by revealing the weaknesses of communism rather than achieving constitutional
restraint and limits on state power.15 Thus, the West won by default, not by achieving a more
perfect democratic and capitalist system. Hayek contended that the regulatory mechanisms of
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Western democracy that emerged, including a system of central banks and the establishment of
more technocratic governance, illustrated a democratic deviation rather than democratic selfdiscipline.16 In the wake of the Cold War victory, Eastern European countries joined the
European Union and European leaders established the currency union. Both of these leaps
forward in the European integration process encountered unanticipated challenges that
emboldened doubts surrounding the project of political and economic union. While many nationstates continue to apply for and covet membership in the European Union, there remains a stark
contrast between the economic performance and cultural values of core member states and those
of peripheral member states. The arrival of new political and capitalist crises challenges the
West’s Cold War victory, raising suspicions regarding the laissez-faire principles, goals of
political unification, and fiscal criteria that undergird the stateless currency union.
An analysis of the Eurozone crisis cannot treat its economic and political ramifications
independently, as the crisis presents itself as a challenge to both the logic of financial markets
and European democracy. The financial crisis threatened the survival of the European political
project. While facing its financial crisis in 2008, no one in the United States of America
questioned the legitimacy of the state itself. In Europe, on the other hand, the financial crisis
called into question the value of participating in economic and political union. The Eurozone
crisis and the solutions that subsequently emerged represent a breach in the EU’s fundamental
commitment to the principle of subsidiarity. The crisis worsened pre-existing tensions between
national parliaments and supranational powers, as national parliaments felt constrained by
austerity measures pushed at the European level. The failure of EU policies to enumerate
appropriate political actions in the face of economic crisis, such as creating a lender of last resort,
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meant that last minute deals often unfavorably burdened and constrained national parliaments
and their citizens. The economic inequality sustained in the Eurozone also reveals itself as a
crisis of European democracy. Today, Europe holds the highest level of private wealth in the
world, yet European governments face grave debt crises. This paradox elucidates that the
distribution of wealth rather than absolute wealth determines levels of public debt.17 The problem
of peripheral state prosperity compounds doubts surrounding the currency union and its ability to
deliver more uniform prosperity to its member states. The conundrum between economic
inequality and the maintenance of democratic values proves particularly acute in Europe. Some
argue that Europe remains ill suited for the project of political and economic union. However,
perhaps the problem lies in the recipe rather than the ingredients. The assumption that monetary
union and trade liberalization deepen political unity belies the Eurozone’s failure to produce a
successfully integrated continent.

Postwar: Rebuilding Europe and the Beginning of European Integration

The nation-state devastated the European continent during World War II, leaving 40
million Europeans dead. In 1946, Winston Churchill gave his famous “United States of Europe”
speech at the University of Zurich. In this speech, Churchill proposed the creation of “a structure
under which [the European fabric] can dwell in peace, safety and freedom.”18 Churchill
envisioned this United States of Europe working in an equalizing manner, ending Europe’s
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“nationalistic quarrels” by ensuring that no state would possess more power than any other
state.19 Drawing on a long history of discussions of a United States of Europe beginning in 1923
with Count Coundenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa, Churchill’s speech placed a premium on
political unity as the primary means to engage in peaceful institution-making in continent.20
Europe’s devastation after World War II gave birth to reinvigorated attempts to pursue
European federalism, continent-wide socioeconomic security, and military and diplomatic peace
between nation-states. Tangible steps towards European integration efforts began after the war
with the Schuman Declaration in May 1950. Presented by the French foreign minister Robert
Schuman, the document called for the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) wherein participating members would pool their production of coal and steel. Schuman
contended that the creation of such a Community would make war between European
superpowers materially impossible. This marked the first effort towards establishing
supranational European institutions.
Churchill’s United States of Europe speech and the Schuman Declaration differ
significantly as plans to pursue European peace. Churchill’s speech emphasized the process of
establishing a United States of Europe as a straight-forward one: “All that is needed is the
resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as
their reward blessing instead of cursing.”21 Schuman, on the other hand, writes, “Europe will not
be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements
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which first create a de facto solidarity.”22 Churchill’s invocation assumes the predominance of
supranational interests, while the Schuman Declaration concedes to the power of national
interests in driving a process of European integration. Schuman enumerated a plan for joint
economic development as an imperative step towards founding a federal Europe. His plan for de
facto solidarity replaced Churchill’s reliance on the moral action of Europeans.23 Schuman did
not view European solidarity as a natural state. Instead, European solidarity required deliberate
crafting.

A Period of Change: The Push Towards the Single Market

The 1969 Hague Summit ambitiously expanded the European agenda, quieting initial
efforts to resist Community progress towards more federalist institutions and policies. During the
Hague Summit in 1969, the leaders of the European Community met to discuss completing,
deepening, and widening European integration. During this summit the Community decided to
admit the United Kingdom and placed Economic and Monetary Union on the European agenda.
While the Hague Summit did not begin any formalized discussion of a political union, European
leaders expressed the necessity for deepening European monetary solidarity.24
In the 1980s, discussions on establishing a political union began, as the push towards
deeper integration continued. The 1984 Spinelli Report first attempted to draft language to
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establish a European Union, but this effort did not come to fruition until the 1993 signing of the
Maastricht Treaty. The 1986 Single European Act preceded the Maastricht Treaty, completing
the common market and expressing the goal to establish a common currency. Historian Ivan
Berend writes, “Instead of a united Western Europe as a defense against war, the [Single
European] Act declared that the Community protects the common interests of its member
countries by creating a common market with the free movement of goods, people, services, and
capital.”25 The common market transformed an originally diplomatic goal into a European-wide
effort to establish economic cohesion in hopes of yielding political unity.
New economic challenges introduced by increasingly competitive international trade
raised questions regarding the ideal European political and economic institutional set-up. In
1989, Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission, gave a speech exalting the federalist
vision of the founding fathers of Europe and insisting that the single market would not only
deepen integration but also ensure Europe’s competitiveness on an international level. Delors
declared, “History is accelerating. We must accelerate as well.”26 In the face of new challenges
brought by globalization, Delors insisted on the single market and an accompanying commitment
to European unification as necessary measures to guarantee the continent’s future prosperity.
Delors’ speech contrasted greatly with UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s speech in 1988
in which she indicted Delors’ call for a strong European state. In her speech, Thatcher discussed
the importance of defining Europe, not as a creation of the Treaty of Rome, but as a collection of
independent and sovereign states.27 She declared, “To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate
25
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power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise
the objectives we seek to achieve.”28 The shared commitment to economic liberalization endured
while the path towards greater political unity remained the aspiration of a few. The desire to
maintain economic competitiveness in a globalized economy pushed Europe forward despite the
contradictory political visions accompanying this ideal.

The Eurozone and its Crisis

European monetary union ostensibly ended the national economic sovereignty of its
participants. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty established a monetary union with a single currency
that fixed exchange rates under the auspices of the European Central Bank. Utilizing a classical
liberal model and the example of the Bundesbank, the architects of the currency union and its
central bank envisioned and attempted to secure the independence of economic affairs from
political pressures. Unfortunately, the Maastricht Treaty marked the beginning of the European
Union’s uncertain future ridden with Euro-skepticism and confrontations from plebiscitary
pressures. The ratification crisis in which a series of national referendums challenged
Maastricht’s passage demonstrated that democracy and citizenship remained largely understood
and practiced at the national level. The presumption that the euro would lead automatically to
deeper integration undergirded the effort to establish the monetary union. However, Maastricht
pushed for supranational enforcement of fiscal rules without sufficient prior political integration.
The strong belief that the symbolic power of money could create a shared identity obfuscated the
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persistence of differing national fiscal approaches.29 Maastricht introduced rigorous rules for
economic engagement in the currency union while it simultaneously challenged nation-state
authority as members made significant concessions of economic sovereignty. The ultimate
passage of Maastricht signaled the demise of the permissive consensus as political elites could no
longer rely on an apathetic European public to secure the progress of European integration.
Today’s circumstance demonstrates the need for a new political consensus to support the
future existence of Europe’s economic and political union. Erik Jones, a European scholar,
argues that the widespread political cautioning that a single country exiting the euro would bring
down the Eurozone misidentifies the real threat posed by the current crisis.30 Jones writes, “the
European project will continue so long as Europeans want to participate.”31 Fatalistic
commentary on the future of the Eurozone places the EU’s security in the euro rather than in
public faith. The political response to the crisis and the remedies conceived demonstrate the
prioritization of appeasing financial markets over efforts to ensure the willingness of public
participation in the European project.
Scholars continue to propose long-term solutions to help manage the tensions introduced
by monetary and political integration. Andrew Duff argues that fiscal solidarity will require a
European transition into a federal union to deliver “deep democracy” and “foster a sophisticated
sense of European citizenship.”32 While Duff argues that a hybrid executive and opaque
democracy will not suffice to provide an adequate governance structure to accompany European
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monetary union, it remains unclear whether or not a complete transition into a federal polity will
provide the most promising solution to Europe’s problems. While scholars maintain a consensus
that monetary union requires political institutional support, Jean Pisani-Ferry asks scholars to
consider the question, “why would political union necessarily improve the monetary union’s
resilience to shocks?”33 Daniela Schwarzer proposes two potential alternatives to federalist
transformation. In order to ensure the future of the Eurozone, Schwarzer argues that a leap
forward in integration must occur.34 Schwarzer also proposes that the current crisis renders
necessary a change in either the current structure or the current membership.35 Whether the EU
transforms into a full-fledged federal polity, deepens political integration, or pursues a change in
membership, any path forward must seek to secure improved monetary policies while also
fostering a sense of European unity and democratic support.

Theories of Integration

Economic integration allowed the larger project of European integration and unification
to progress. By combining industries, the founding fathers of Europe believed they could secure
regional peace and unity. After the enactment of the Schuman Plan, integration expanded and
established agricultural and regional development policies, a European Court of Justice, and the
common currency. While many contend the creation of the single currency represents the
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ultimate supranational spillover, the Eurozone’s crisis reveals that the task of economic and
political integration remains more incomplete than previously thought. Of course the
establishment of a European Union and its single currency speaks to the power of the federalist
vision. What began as an effort to pool coal and steel production resulted in the massive
bureaucracy in Brussels. However, the challenge posed by new European crises demonstrates the
persistence of unresolved political and economic tensions and the arrival of unanticipated threats.
Neither the neofunctionalist theory of spillover nor the liberal intergovernmentalist theory
of domestic preference formation and interstate bargaining fully accounts for the dynamics of
European integration. Ernst B. Haas’ theory of neofunctionalism asserts that integration creates a
new political structure that supplants the pre-existing one. Haas argues that the integration of
individual sectors leads to spillover effects, which further the process of integration. In this
theory, integration strengthens supranational powers while weakening the nation-state. Many call
the creation of a European monetary union the ultimate supranational spillover.36 Given that the
Eurozone crisis reveals the weakness of supranational political and economic legitimacy, many
now question the neofunctionalist account of integration. The salience of national politics and
preferences that threatened the Eurozone in the wake of the crisis demonstrate the breakdown of
the permissive consensus on which spillover theory relies. In contrast to Haas’ theory of
neofunctionalism, Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of liberal intergovernmentalism characterizes the
nation-state as the rational actor driving integration. In Moravcsik’s liberal
intergovernmentalism, integration is a state-centric choice and may even strengthen or rescue the
nation-state. While liberal intergovernmentalism more accurately aligns with the history of
European integration than neofunctionalism, Moravcsik’s theory seems to exaggerate the power
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nation-states maintain after the establishment of supranational institutions. The dominant pattern
of tension between Europe and its members demonstrates that nation-state participants largely
feel constrained by the rules imposed at the European-level. While both theories exaggerate their
own version of the relationship between the nation-state and the emerging supranational body, an
interrogation of these theories against present-day European realities indicates the awkwardness
of the position held by nation-state members of the European Union.
Designing a supranational body that derives legitimacy from nation-state interests means
that nation-states participating in deepening integration simultaneously occupy a role as the
primary proponents, drivers, and beneficiaries of integration and a role as the protectors of
national sovereignty. This position of the nation-state in the history of European integration
reveals a fundamental tension. The founding fathers of Europe believed European integration
would produce a federal union to replace the power of the nation-state.37 The nation-state’s
gradual transference of sovereignty to the supranational level would legitimize the union,
“anchored in an expanded popular sovereignty, based on universal suffrage, its executive
answerable to an elected legislature, and its economy subject to requirements of social
responsibility.”38 Historian Perry Anderson provides a grim account of the present-day distance
from this vision of the European Union. Anderson emphasizes that the customs union made
possible through European integration failed to produce enforcement mechanisms for
supranational decisions.39 In addition to the emergence of unaccountable decision-making
powers at the European level, the elected European Parliament seems irrelevant to most
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European voters. 40 This only serves to exacerbate the legislative detachment between the
supranational and national levels. Many view the European Union as an awkward political body
whose politics burden nation-states still responsible for selecting their own fiscal, social, military
and foreign policy regimes. The Union’s part-federal and part-intergovernmental structure means
its participants occupy the paradoxical position as nation-states and member states. This inherent
structural tension proves a significant source of the democratic legitimacy problems plaguing the
union.
Rather than a complete transference of their powers to the European level, national
parliaments have managed to maintain significant powers while they also sacrifice crucial areas
of national sovereignty. The relationship between the national and supranational level represents
a tension of powers rather than a balance of powers. The policies decided upon at the national
parliamentary level remain the most salient in the minds of European voters while the policies
that crafted at the European level appear solely regulatory, obtuse, and somewhat impertinent.
The continuing power of the nation-state in European political life presents a challenge to the
theory of neofunctionalist spillover, which assumes that the process of integration itself erodes
the nation-state and superimposes a supranational polity on the pre-existing political community.
Thus, while integration continues to spillover into an increasing number of policy spheres,
nation-state constituencies more clearly see themselves as participants in national democracies
rather than as European citizens.
The historical achievements of wider and deeper European integration occurred in the
absence of widespread enthusiasm and efforts to construct a European identity. This pattern of
European integration helps to explain the persisting power of the nation-state. The breakdown of
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the permissive consensus reveals a weakness in the neofunctionalist theory of spillover, as it fails
to account for the occurrence of deeper integration without enthusiastic support. Margaret
Thatcher’s concern to maintain European economic competitiveness in a globalized economy did
not represent any endorsement of a European superstate.41 This attitude exemplifies the
proliferation of European economic consensus without political consensus. For some, the
ultimate implementation of the single market represented a necessary step to achieve regional
economic prosperity but it did not signal the presence of any universal desire to transform
Europe into federal polity.
To create a complete account of the Eurozone crisis requires a deep understanding of how
the political and the economic elements of European governance affect and one another. John
Dunn argues that there exist economic limits to modern politics. He contends that in order to
develop an understanding of modern politics, one must offer a thorough analysis of how
economic realities constrain the political possibilities of modern governance. Klaus Armingeon
and Lucio Baccaro’s account of the sovereign debt crises facing Europe, on the other hand,
emphasize the political limits to economic governance. Armingeon and Baccaro argue that the
policy response to the sovereign debt crisis defies the assumptions of comparative political
economists who predict that countries with different domestic political features will respond
differently when faced with a common shock.42 Instead, the response sovereign debt Europe
demonstrates a policy convergence and evidences a shrinking policy space.43 The rise of
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technocratic governance in the wake of the crisis means “governments of different political
orientations and of different parliamentary strength [find] themselves implementing essentially
the same structural adjustment programme.”44 Armingeon and Baccaro write that these
“developments signal serious problems of democratic legitimacy.”45 Understanding the
economic and political limits present in the crisis climate offers a view of the Eurozone as a
victory in the European integration process as well as a lost opportunity to strengthen European
democracy and its political citizenship.
In addition to the political challenges of modern economic governance, the economic
governance of the stateless currency union faces the challenge of tension between the nationstate and supranational authorities. Political and economic authority in Europe remains
ambiguous at its various levels of governance. Economist Thomas Piketty argues that Europe’s
sovereignty problem presents the primary threat to the currency union. Thomas Piketty argues
that the Eurozone crisis was inevitable as monetary union did not lead to “political, fiscal, and
budgetary union, to ever closer cooperation among the member states.”46 Piketty writes, “When
countries relinquish monetary sovereignty, it is essential to restore their fiscal sovereignty over
matters no longer within the purview of the nation-state.”47 Any economic solution to the euroarea crisis must possess a political component capable of addressing the fundamental problem of
sovereignty in Europe. Despite decades of regional integration secured via economic integration,
the relationship between the state and the economy in Europe remains uncomfortably
ambiguous.
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Conclusion

The Eurozone crisis indicts the assumptions of the major theories of integration. The
problem lies not in the fact that Europe’s destination remains unknown. Rather, leaders of
European integration have failed to translate the aims of the European political project to their
constituencies and develop a sophisticated European citizenship. The participants of European
integration embodied radical endorsements of divergent visions for the character and extent of
European integration while the very grand project of economic and political union moved
forward apace. An unadulterated belief in laissez-faire principles, the conviction that the cash
nexus can secure political unity, and the establishment of ambitious fiscal criteria that
overlooked nation-state economic ideologies, undergirded the Eurozone at it moment of
inception. The most recent crisis of European technocracy and capitalism unraveled the West’s
Cold War victory, calling into question the assumption that the cash nexus establishes political
unity. Economic determinism rests as the heart of this assumption in its belief that a successful
European economy can deliver the politics it needs to secure its viability. However, the failure of
this assumption helps explain the unanticipated democratic and fiscal challenges facing Europe.
The character of the Eurozone as a stateless currency produces a dangerous politics that both
obstruct and require the development of deeper European unity.
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CHAPTER TWO: BUILDING A LIBERAL CRITIQUE OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS

Introduction

The liberal critique of the Eurozone crisis identifies the crucial need for a European state
to accompany the currency union. While the liberal critique diagnoses this fundamental
structural shortcoming, it proves deficient in ameliorating Europe’s political legitimacy problem.
Political disaffection towards the currency union as well as social policy demands of European
welfare states, remain absent from the liberal account. When the liberal critique fails to
sufficiently grapple with the political elements plaguing the Eurozone, its conception of a
European state also falls short. Hayek’s model of interstate federalism pairs political federation
with a liberal economic order. This pairing, however, does not require the presence of a
European demos. Instead, the Hayekian ideal argues for economic unity while ignoring the
importance of political unity. Rather than building a common political culture that binds member
states to the supranational polity, Hayek contends that the interstate federation shall not extend
itself where agreement does not exist. Unfortunately, the Eurozone crisis demonstrates the
difficulty of achieving successful economic liberalization without establishing a sense of
common European values and ideals. Given the threat political disaffection poses to the currency
union, any critique of the crisis must sufficiently wrestle with this component of Europe’s
legitimacy problem. Similarly, the model of a social market economy envisioned by German
Ordoliberals insufficiently addresses the political responsibilities of the state. While the state, as
imagined by Ordo thinkers, intentionally designs the principles and aims undergirding the free
market system, the state’s role in drafting and enacting social policies remains superfluous. The
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policies of European welfare states do not simply represent concessions to citizens’ political
demands but demonstrate the indispensable state role in presiding over decisions on the
appropriate level of state intervention in economic life. Ordos, however, fail to understand how
market logic necessitates state intervention. Ultimately, the Ordo vision remains vague in its
enumeration of state responsibility to alleviating the inequality of its citizens. While both the
Hayekian and Ordoliberal critiques identify the challenges that arise from the Eurozone’s
statelessness, efforts to envision a European state will founder if unable to build political
consensus and a clear understanding of social policy obligations.

Hayek’s Interstate Federalism

Hayek’s model of European federalism establishes economic liberalization without political
unity, a template that achieves relative peace but proves politically unsustainable. Hayek
contends that only by pairing a strong interstate federation with a liberal economy can Europe
achieve harmony among its member nations. Political union without the elimination of economic
barriers between members will fail to establish the “internal coherence of the Union.”48 Hayek
writes,
“The existence of any measure of economic seclusion or isolation on the part of an individual state
produces a solidarity of interests among all its inhabitants and conflicts between their interests and
those of the inhabitants of other states which – although we have become so accustomed to such
conflicts as to take them for granted – is by no means a natural or inevitable thing… It seems fairly
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certain that political union between erstwhile sovereign states would not last long unless
accompanied by economic union.”49

This argument exhibits a fundamental shortcoming of the Hayekian interstate federation. In the
Eurozone, national “solidarity of interests” persist despite member state agreement to the
currency union’s fiscal criteria. Rather than inspiring unity, the Maastricht criteria breeds
political resentment. The budgetary rules laid out in the Maastricht Treaty disregard national
differences on the appropriate level of state intervention in economic life and state response to
economic crisis. Through economic liberalization, the single currency area promised Europe an
economically competitive edge in the age of globalization; however, the terms of membership in
the single currency area appear more politically untenable than ever. During the crisis years,
efforts to maintain European economic liberalization constrained national parliaments. The
undemocratic character of bail-out agreements imposed by the European-level engendered
political resentment among national constituencies.50 Monetary union without a state that builds
political unity yields an incomplete recipe for peace. Contrary to the Hayekian model, economic
liberalization alone does not sufficiently serve as harmonization.
Given the predominance of national political discontent during the crisis years,
the post-national assumptions that undergird Hayek’s interstate federation appear
premature. Perry Anderson writes, “what [Hayek] did not anticipate...is the disaffection
that the regime he envisaged has aroused in the masses subject to its decisions.”51 Euroskeptic populist parties experienced unprecedented success after the Eurozone crisis. The
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True Finns party that campaigned against Eurozone bail-out agreements made electoral
gains in the 2011 Finnish elections.52 Similarly, the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom and
France’s National Front continue to demonstrate the increasing popularity of anti-euro
and anti-immigrant platforms.53 While Hayek argues that achieving peace requires
economic liberalization, he does not address the politics produced when economic
liberalization yields crises. The challenges of the Eurozone crisis extended beyond its
economic circumstances and exacerbated European political discontent. In this way, the
financial crisis posed an existential threat to Europe.
The current crisis reveals that an interstate federation without a European demos
challenges the Hayekian vision for European harmony. Hayek’s constraining rules for
policy enactment only serve to make agreement more difficult to achieve in Europe’s
diverse union. In order to accept an interstate federation, Hayek argues, one must accept
that “certain forms of economic policy will have to be conducted by the federation or by
nobody at all.”54 He continues,
“Whether the federation will exercise these powers will depend on the possibility of reaching true
agreement, not only on whether these powers are to be used, but on how they are to be used. The
main point is that, in many cases in which it will prove impossible to reach such agreement, we shall
have to resign ourselves rather to have no legislation in a particular field than the state legislation
which would break up the economic unity of the federation. Indeed, this readiness to have no
legislation at all on some subjects rather than state legislation will be the acid test of whether we are
intellectually mature for the achievement of superstate organization.”55
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The Hayekian interstate federation does not require its envisioned European state to build
political agreement. While agreement proves essential, Hayek disregards the political
contestation required in a democracy that actually helps construct consensus and shape
the demos. Without building a framework for European political unity, the political
disaffection produced by the crisis proves particularly potent. The Hayekian order now
confronts fundamental obstacles to achieving any resolution of the political discontent
produced. Höpner and Schäfer argue that the push for integration through law rather than
political integration, does not sufficiently reflect the competing interests represented
within the diversity of member states.56 Progress in integration and the achievement of a
Hayekian interstate federation, thus, does not represent the presence of political
consensus. This is not a problem of intellectual maturity, as Hayek contends, but a
problem inherent in a diverse union that lacks a strong state and demos.
Hayek’s argument in favor of interstate federalism proves most appealing in its
promise of less government involvement in economic life. Hayek writes that “planning,
or central direction of economic activity, presupposes the existence of common ideals
and common values; and the degree to which planning can be carried is limited to the
extent to which agreement on such a common scale of values can be obtained or
enforced.”57 As the heterogeneity of the federation increases, agreement becomes less
likely and thus constrains the ability of a diverse federation to plan and enforce policy
designs and rules. The Hayekian interstate federation does not identify the absence of a
“common scale of values” as problematic. Instead, either “common ideals and values”
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exist within a federation or they do not exist. This model presupposes the presence of
“common ideals and values” rather than providing the interstate federation with the task
of building a common political culture. However, the absence of “common ideals and
values” proves increasingly problematic in the wake of the Eurozone crisis. The Fiscal
Compact, the result of negotiations during the financial crisis, introduced stricter fiscal
regulations and constraints on national budget deficits, imposing fines on governments
that fail to meet the new regulatory criteria. This solution to the Eurozone’s financial
woes constrains national government override and breeds further resentment towards
supranational measures.58 The Hayekian model establishes a diverse union that pairs
federation with economic liberalization but does not require its state to build political
consensus among its members and their constituencies. Without political consensus, the
technocratic response to the Eurozone crisis inspired a sense that the fiscal rules imposed
by the European-level lacked democratic accountability. This proves as much an
indictment of the Eurozone’s statelessness as it does the Hayekian failure to establish
common political ground between member states.

The Blind Ambition of Ordo-Liberalism

The failure of the Ordo argument to extend its definition of the strong state into the realm
of social policy marks a fundamental oversight. Ordoliberalism argues that a free market system
requires the preliminary intervention of the state to create and order economic life. Unlike other
advocates of the free market system who assume that the self-regulating market delivers
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freedom, Ordo-liberalism remains skeptical of a free market system divorced from a strong state.
Only the unique position of the state, not the market, can safeguard the fundamental rights of
individuals and ensure the proper functioning of the free market.59 However, the Ordo vision of
social policy fails to explain European sociopolitical development. In the Ordo market economy,
fair competition produces an equitable society.60 Ordos did not see the need for any extensive
elaboration on social policy matters and instead maintained faith in the cash nexus to secure the
economic well-being of individuals. Many Ordos offered no guidance for “where the constraints
of the market economy intersect with the social conditions required for its functioning.”61 This
oversight proves detrimental to the Ordo vision. The rudimentary character of Ordo social policy
fails to explain the simultaneous historical development of the free market economy and the
growth of welfare state commitments.
The vague character of the Ordo position on social policy, as opposed to the
strengthening of European welfare states, evidences the shortcoming of the Ordo political
economy that lacks a robust framework for state intervention in economic life. Many scholars
argue that the increasing social priorities of the state demonstrate a fundamental deviation from
the social market economy model.62 Norman P. Barry, however, offers that this deviation stems
from shortcomings in the Ordo vision rather than any flaw in state development. He writes, “the
social aims of the social market economy were sufficiently vague to permit an extension of the
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state welfare system while still remaining nominally within [the Ordo] rubric.”63 Barry argues
that the end-state features of Ordoliberalism failed to set boundaries to limit state growth.64
Procedural-liberals, on the other hand, seek to “subject government action to a much wider form
of consent.”65 However, Barry’s argument that holds the end-state features of the Ordo vision
responsible for the massive increase in the social commitments of the state, fails to explain
today’s climate. While the welfare state and its commitments have expanded in a manner that
does not clearly align with the Ordo vision, recent economic changes necessitate an increase in
state welfare responsibilities. The growing commitments of the welfare state reflect a change in
the economic structure as much as the end-state features of Ordoliberalism.
The Ordo vision proves incompatible with the endogenous changes taking place in
modern European welfare states. Several scholars explain the dynamics of the current constraints
on European welfare states, revealing the inability of the Ordo vision to address concerns of
consumer demand and the challenges presented by private and public sector employment. Paul
Pierson rejects the globalization thesis that claims that increasing international trade
liberalization weakens the nation-state and necessitates austerity. Pierson suggests that the
globalization thesis obfuscates the dynamics taking place within affluent democracies. He argues
that the stress facing the welfare state results from endogenous, post-industrial changes. These
changes include the service-based employment profiles of affluent societies, the maturation of
the welfare state, ageing populations, and radical changes in household structures.66 These
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changes, rather than increasing international exchange, have confronted governments with the
“trilemma of the service economy”:
“governments and nations confront a three-way choice, or ‘trilemma,’ between budgetary restraint,
income equality, and employment growth. While it is possible to pursue two of these goals
simultaneously, it has so far proved impossible to achieve all three. Private service employment
growth can be accomplished only at a cost of wage inequality. Therefore, if wage equality is a
priority, employment growth can be generated only through employment in the public services
sector – at a cost either of higher tax rates or of borrowing (both implying lack of budgetary
restraint).”67

This conflict between the goals of employment, wage equality, and budgetary constraint results
from the changes in the productivity in employment structures. Many attribute the expansion of
the service economy to the significant slowdown in economic growth. The gap in productivity
between manufacturing and service sectors presents a difficult problem for the welfare state.
Studies by Baumol and Bowen concluded that the service sector does not naturally lead to
productivity growth.68 With a higher demand for services, “it becomes increasingly difficult to
combine rising wages with lower prices. The virtuous circle between falling prices and rising
real demand, as experienced during the expansion of manufacturing employment, is therefore
broken.”69 The expansion of the service economy and the need to generate cheap prices and high
demand results in lower wages.70 But, if wages in services were comparable to wages in the
manufacturing sector, the private sector would contract “Baumol’s cost disease,” which would
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slow down employment.71 Thus, “High growth in market-provided services – necessary to
compensate for declining manufacturing employment – therefore presupposes a more
inegalitarian wage structure.”72 A better understanding of today’s challenges reveals that the
most pressing sociopolitical problems do not lie in the rapid expansion of the welfare state and
its commitments alone but also in the nature of employment offered in the market today.
The challenges accompanying economic growth in the free market today counter the
Ordo vision and its ideal, welfare-maximizing competition. Given the new forms of inequalities
introduced by macro-level economic trends, a reinvigorated political conversation on state
responsibility for wealth distribution proves essential for the present-day. While Ordos
understood the importance of countering state power, they remained largely blind to the need for
ongoing state-sanctioned redistribution:
“Walter Eucken wanted social policy measures to be taken only as subsidiary measures. The
competitive system he was striving after was one that would work for social policy aims not only
through its efficiency, but also through its respect for human dignity. The individual, however,
should be responsible for his own security (for example, in the case of illness or in old age). Only
when emergencies or, to go one step further, undesirably large differences in income, cannot be
remedied in any other way should redistribution take place primarily by means of progressive tax
income.”73

While the Ordos believed that the individual ought to provide for his own security, there is no
state in the European Union that has pursued this ideal. Today’s structural problems demonstrate
that inequality often falls outside the purview of individual responsibility as individuals are
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subject to macro-level changes in the economy. The fundamental change affecting modern
European economies includes the productivity of some industries over others which impacts
consumer demand and wage levels. While Eucken acknowledges that there exist moments when
certain wealth disparities warrant the implementation of a progressive tax, the Ordo view seeks
to locate individual well-being predominantly the cash nexus. However, today’s climate reveals
that the conditions of the market with a dominant service economy necessitates permanent
policies on wealth distribution. The economy not only requires the preliminary intervention of
the state to design the principles and aims of the free market system as Ordos contend, the
economy also requires constant and ongoing state intervention to redistribute wealth. This is
antithetical to the Ordo ideal. Present day economic conditions undermine the viability of the
Ordo vision and render it obsolete.
Redistribution is not just rudimentary, as Ordos believe, but essential. Unfortunately for
Ordos, “social policy would be of very little importance both to the workability of the system
and to the principles of economics.”74 Ordos might contend that the modern European welfare
state brought upon itself its own problems by expanding welfare state commitments faster than
GDP. However, the current trilemma facing European economies arise from challenges posed by
the growth of the service economy and Baumol’s cost disease. The options of accepting massive
inequality in the private sector, something Ordos would not have wanted, or the state taking on
responsibility for employment to ensure equality, another outcome Ordos would have found
undesirable, shows that Ordos did not adequately integrate social policy into their vision. Social
policy proves incongruent with the system of the market economy. Social policy does not merely
result from the political demands of citizens. Instead, the economic changes taking place within

74

Lenel, “Evolution of the Social Market Economy,” 29.

32

Europe require state decision on the trilemma of the service economy. An economy without state
action might fail to satisfy consumer needs or expose its citizens to the highly inegalitarian wage
structure of the service economy. Ordos believed that an intentionally designed free market
system renders redistribution unnecessary. Instead, post-industrial changes in the economy
evidence the need not only for a strong constitutional state but also a state that prioritizes its
redistributive responsibilities.

Conclusion

Both the Hayekian and Ordo theories of liberalism advocate for the creation of a state to
accompany the free market economy. However, Hayekian and Ordo arguments fail to address
the primary issues plaguing the currency union today. The depoliticized state in the Hayekian
interstate federation offers little in the way of inspiring the political unity Europe desperately
requires. A European state must work to establish a set of common values and ideals shared
among its demos. The Ordos asserted the need for a strong constitutional state to support the free
market system. However, contemporary economic changes demonstrate the need for permanent
state powers to preside over issues of wealth redistribution as Eurozone members confront an
economic reality in which redistributive efforts prove essential. Solving the structural problem of
the Eurozone’s statelessness by creating a European federation that does not prioritize political
unity and wealth redistribution, proves futile. Such a solution would only widen the existing
distance between the technocratic responses created in the wake of the crisis and the politics
created by new regulatory regime.

33

CHAPTER THREE: BUILDING A SOCIALIST CRITIQUE OF THE EUROZONE
CRISIS

Introduction

A socialist critique of the Eurozone crisis, like the liberal critique, finds the absence of a
European state responsible for the suboptimal performance of the currency union. However, the
Eurozone today remains ill-suited to adapt the ideas articulated by socialist critiques. This misfit
proves as much an indictment of the Eurozone’s structure as it does the ability of socialist
thought to address both the economic and political components of the Eurozone crisis. The
history of the development of social rights and the creation of the first European welfare states
challenges the socialist push for a European-wide social citizenship. As social citizenship does
not directly address unsustainable levels of inequality that result from market logic, creating a
European-wide social citizenship might fail to adequately address the persisting economic
problems plaguing the currency union. Thomas Piketty’s groundbreaking book Capital in the
Twenty-First Century, proposes the creation of political structures capable of imposing a
progressive global tax on capital. However, this proposal will only remain a pipedream if unable
to ameliorate the non-economic political factors threatening the Eurozone. A viable socialist
response to remedy the challenges confronting the currency union must position its ideals within
Europe’s political and economic realities.
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Socialism and Citizenship

The Eurozone ties political unity to the cash nexus, a design that presents a fundamental
challenge to building the solidarity on which socialism depends. Participants in the currency
union lack a sophisticated sense of European citizenship as European citizenship remains
political and not social. While Europeans gained the right to vote in European Parliament
elections, issues of taxation and redistribution remain determined at the nation-state level. The
establishment of a European monetary policy allows Eurozone member states to continue
administering their own social protection programs. Despite the distribution of economic policymaking between the nation-state and supranational level, the Eurozone did not adopt the
economic sovereignty lost at the nation-state level with the establishment of the currency union.
This vacuum in economic sovereignty creates a disjointed European citizenship that exacerbates
the democratic legitimacy problem. Unfortunately, however, fostering a sophisticated European
social citizenship does not promise a solution to the persisting economic problems confronting
the currency union. The history of the development of social rights warns that the establishment
of supranational citizenship alone might not adequately orient a European state towards
redistributive efforts.
Sociologist T.H. Marshall’s theory of the development of rights illuminates that social
citizenship alone cannot address the problem of inequality and distribution that now plague the
Eurozone. Marshall’s account tells the story of the inevitable evolution and expansion of rights.
From civil rights, the right to individual freedom, political rights emerged to protect individual
expressions of political power.75 From political rights, social rights emerged as the right to obtain
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a degree of economic security.76 The attainment of economic security provided “the right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the
standards prevailing in the society.”77 The responsibilities and obligations of the state grew with
each expansion of citizenship rights.78 Marshall’s description of this functionalist progression
also tells the story of the addition of new national institutions to support each successive
expansion of rights.79 The due process of the law protects civil rights, an elected political body
protects political rights, and educational systems along with social services protect social
rights.80 Currently, the European Union possesses institutions that protect citizens’ civil and
political rights but not social rights. However, the establishment of European institutions to meet
the obligations of social rights might not suffice to address the Eurozone’s fundamental wealth
distribution problem. Marshall points out the irony that in England, the growth of citizenship
occurred simultaneously with the growth of capitalism. Marshall writes, the “Differential status,
associated with class, function, and family, was replaced by the single uniform status of
citizenship…[and] provided the foundations of equality on which the structure of inequality
could be built.”81 The egalitarian notion of citizenship served as a form of class-abatement,
creating the foundation to sustain the inequalities produced by capitalism. Thus, socialist efforts
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to establish a deeper European citizenship faces the added task of responding to the deleterious
outcomes of market logic.
The history of the first European welfare states similarly reveals the establishment of
social citizenship as a means to preserve the capitalist status quo. For example, the goal of
German and Austrian social protection before the Second World War sought to limit the
development of socialism.82 Both programs feared unity among the working class and insisted on
the unhindered development of market relations.83 Similarly, Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian
models of social protection did not commit themselves to any politicization of the proletariat.
Both the Anglo-Saxon model and the Scandinavian model hoped to preserve a system of private
property rights without state interference and sought means for distribution only within the
confines of the market.84 These welfare state models bind labor to the market. The socialist
project, however, commits itself to developing a class politics that allows labor to unhinge itself
from the market. Both Marshall’s theory and the history of welfare state development warn
against the assumption that social citizenship can address inequalities produced and sustained
through free markets.
Given that social citizenship does not inherently challenge the inegalitarian outcomes of
capitalism, any creation of a European state and a European-wide social citizenship must strive
to meet the obligations of citizenship outside market exchange. Fred Block and Margaret Somers
enumerate the relationship between social citizenship and the free market. They use the term “the
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contractualization of citizenship” to describe the process whereby the government defunding of
social institutions and public goods threatens the ability of individuals to participate in civic life:
“Citizenship represents a bundle of rights and obligations, especially the rights to those
noncontractual supports necessary for full and equal social inclusion in civil society. These rights
are the legal glue that binds civil society’s noncontractual foundations to its people. They are the
necessary elements for the essential freedoms and ‘capabilities’ that people require to live as equal
members of society…When these rights are contractualized, they become subject to the rules of
quid pro quo market exchange, rules that demand something of equivalent value, usually money or
labor.”85

Governing society only through the rules of supply and demand presents a direct challenge to the
social state as many individuals face exclusion from market exchange.86 Block and Somers argue
that public goods available exclusively to those able to pay results in the “‘liquidation’ of a
community’s noncontractual foundations.”87 Only by meeting the obligations to the
noncontractual foundations of citizenship outside of market exchange can individuals participate
as full and equal members in civil society. Social citizenship proves essential to the social order
because it strengthens the connection between the individual and the state. Those who argue that
citizenship should be treated “as a contractual quid pro quo market relationship,” perpetuate a
kind of market fundamentalism.88 Block and Somers discuss the disastrous effect of the
contractualization of citizenship on “people who have little of value to exchange. With few skills
and a deficit of cultural capital, there is no demand for their services, and thus no right to full
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citizenship. They are, in effect, internally stateless.”89 The cash nexus cannot secure the right to
full citizenship as it results in exclusion and denies many individuals a state. Following Block
and Somers’ argument, the Eurozone not only requires a state, it requires a state that will create
European civic life outside the common market.
The establishment of a European social citizenship might deepen the political
commitment of members and their constituencies to the European Union. However, many
economic factors plague the Eurozone in addition to its problem of political commitment. The
economic health of core member states compared with peripheral member states reveals that the
currency union sustains massive inequities between its members. As The Economist argues,
government-debt did not cause the Eurozone crisis: “The problem, instead, was one of massive
capital flows across borders, which encouraged high levels of private borrowing in the
economies that eventually got into trouble.”90 In addition to its public debt crises, the Eurozone
must offer a solution to fix the problem of capital flow within its borders. Piketty’s research also
identifies the long-term trends of markets that generate a high rate of return on capital in periods
of slow economic growth.91 The establishment of a European social citizenship might offer the
currency union a level of political protection during its next crisis but will not sufficiently
address these economic challenges.
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Piketty and his Progressive Global Tax on Capital

Piketty’s proposal for a progressive global tax on capital falls short in creating the
politically legitimate state institutions required to support such a utopian vision. Piketty’s
account of the long-term evolution of wealth finds that the capitalist form naturally produces
unsustainable levels of inequality that inevitably yield crises. He asserts that the “private rate of
return on capital (r) can be significantly higher for long periods of time than the rate of growth of
income and output (g).”92 The past forty years have seen a massive increase in private wealth. In
2010, the total value of private wealth represented between four and seven years of national
income, whereas private wealth represented only two to three and a half years of national income
in 1970.93 The task of the state in the twenty-first century appears self-evident to Piketty: the
state must reign in capital. However, in order for a European state to begin reigning in capital, it
must grapple with European politics in their present form.
The element of European political culture supporting Piketty’s vision remains wholly
fictitious. Piketty suggests that modern democracies imagine new political institutions for
financial regulation.94 Only democratic deliberation, Piketty argues remains suited to answer
questions regarding the state’s role in wealth distribution.95 A progressive global tax on capital
would bring about a political culture able to “promote the general interest over private interest”
and would preserve a healthy competition able to maintain “economic openness and the forces of
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competition.”96 This kind of approach orients itself towards the establishment of both a political
culture and market mechanisms to maintain competitiveness. Piketty attempts to offer a
structural solution to the problem of unsustainable wealth inequality in the form of his
progressive global tax on capital. Unfortunately, Piketty’s solution relies on understanding
European politics as they might be rather than European politics as they are.
The proposal for a European state to impose a progressive global tax on capital does not
adequately consider that greater fiscal solidarity presupposes European political cohesion.
However, Piketty’s employment of inequality as a lens through which to view the most recent
crisis strives to understand the political and market elements necessary to achieve a solution for
Europe.97 While Piketty views inequality as an indictment of both market logic and modern
democracy, his proposal to ameliorate inequality does not orient itself towards Europe’s political
challenges. Inequality emerges not contrary to market efficiencies and logic but because of
market efficiencies and logic. This necessitates a new political debate regarding state
intervention in the economy. Piketty’s approach assumes that the state must respond to the
deleterious outcomes of free markets, yet he does not assume that the state also requires
mechanisms to respond to the deleterious non-economic political factors facing the Eurozone
today. The Hayekian interstate federation has produced political disaffections that now impinge
on the ability to engage in the necessary democratic deliberation Piketty’s questions on
redistribution require. Macro-level inequities between member states breeds political
disenchantment with the currency union. Xenophobic and fascist responses to the migrant crisis
signal the successful rise of right-wing populism and the politics of fear associated with
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increasing political and economic insecurity. European integration as an effort to aid cooperation
between traditionally hostile countries still faces the political challenge of persisting resentment
towards the Germans. Ngaire Woods writes, “the European Stability Mechanisms, for its part, is
less a sign of European integration than of continued German dominance… the markets assume
that the European Stability Mechanism will reflect Germany’s intentions, and the Eurozone
governments know that there will be negative repercussions at any hint that Germany
disapproves of a loan.”98 Unfortunately, Piketty’s economic solution remains too far removed
from contemporary political circumstances to be considered anything other than exceptionally
utopian.
Understanding the development of these non-economic political challenges clarifies how
Piketty’s solution falls short. While an increased sense of socioeconomic insecurity has created a
political context favorable to populist ideology and tactics, populism does not arise exclusively
from socioeconomic insecurity. One scholar of European populism cautions against the ubiquity
of explanations that portray the rise of the populist right as “a passive consequence of macrolevel socioeconomic development.”99 While macro-level socioeconomic developments are
essential considerations when discussing the rise of right populism in Western Europe, they are
not sufficient in themselves to supply a complete explanation for the successful rise of populist
right radical parties. The increasing sense of political and economic uncertainty created by
macro-level socioeconomic patterns in Western Europe such as globalization, increased
immigration, and post-industrialization, has not necessitated populist right politics, but has
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created a favorable context in which right populism can flourish. Populism thickens
socioeconomic fear, a sense that the current political system is illegitimate, and a sense that the
ordinary voter is under attack by the corrupt political elite and the immigrant. Through
understanding the trends of the development of populist success in Europe, it becomes clear that
populist politics operate within an economic context but do not discretely relate to economic
conditions alone.
Piketty’s history of inequality over time offers new knowledge to better understand the
logic of markets. His account lays out the fundamental contradiction of capitalism and the
intolerable levels of inequality it produces. The task of politics, however, remains somewhat
vague in his account, even if it is understood as essential. The proposal for a progressive global
tax on capital attempts to rectify the the condition of internal statelessness Block and Somers
observe. However, a fiscal union housed in a European state will not yield fiscal or political
solidarity if it only addresses the most recent crisis as a crisis of capitalism and not a crisis of
European politics.

Conclusion

Unlike the liberal critique of the Eurozone crisis, socialist critiques that call for the
establishment of a European state imagine social citizenship and redistributive efforts as primary
responsibilities of the European polity. Unfortunately, the incomplete character of socialist
solutions renders them difficult for the European Union to adopt. The egalitarian ideals of
Socialist calls to establish a European-wide social citizenship do not directly address the
problems derived from macro-level economic circumstances. Piketty’s progressive global tax on
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capital relies on the fiction of a European political community. This presents a fundamental
challenge since the creation of European political cohesion presupposes the enactment new
forms of financial regulation. Reigning in capital on a European scale appears unfeasible at a
time when Europe proves greatly divided.
Perhaps Piketty and Hayek share the mistake of imagining solutions and structures
without considering the politics they produce or the politics that presently exist in Europe. While
Hayek does not concern his model with building a common set of European values and ideals,
Piketty mirrors Europe’s founding fathers by relying on the fiction of a European community.
The interrelationship between the economic and political factors plaguing the currency union
threaten this assumption of a strong European community. A recent article argues that
“the really disconcerting thing is that while the crisis response…reduced the threat of scenario in
which a market panic causes the ejection of a member country, it reinforced the macroeconomic
rigidity of the single-currency area…If the euro-area is now safer from markets than it was precrisis, it is more vulnerable to the political backlash that will inevitably result, in one country or
another, at some time or another, when the strictures of Europe's monetary union become too
painful to put up with any longer.”100

Given this European political-economic dialectic, should the union and its members fix
Europe as it is or imagine Europe as it ought to be?
The shortcomings of socialist approaches to social citizenship and wealth redistribution
indicate the need for a more sophisticated theoretical and practical understanding of a socialist
relationship between the state and the cash nexus. Fixing Europe as it is addresses the post-crisis
economic realities but only formulates short-term solutions that will ultimately prove politically
unsustainable. Imagining Europe as it ought to be offers new political institutions but does not

100

“The euro crisis was not a government-debt crisis,” The Economist.

44

grapple with the democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis whose politics limit efforts to establish
new institutions. Europe might not be politically prepared for the kind of democratic deliberation
Piketty deems necessary to address how the individual, the state, and the economy ought to
preside over the challenges of inequality. However, Piketty’s insistence on constructing a logic
of rights appropriate for the 21st century seems particularly pressing for Europe’s stateless
currency union. He argues democracies must discuss
“the means of effecting real improvement in the living conditions of the least advantaged, the precise
extent of the rights that can be granted to all (in view of economic and budgetary constraints and the
many related uncertainties), and exactly what factors are within and beyond the control of
individuals (where does luck end and where do effort and merit begin?). Such questions will never
be answered by abstract principles or mathematical formulas. The only way to answer them is
through democratic deliberation and political confrontation. The institutions and rules that govern
democratic debate and decision-making therefore play a central role, as do the relative power and
persuasive capabilities of different social groups.”101

Socialism must answer these questions to sustain the noncontractual foundations of citizenship
while also creating a state that can avoid the historical trappings of the command economy. A
response to the crisis must preserve the rationality of the free market system while strengthening
Europeans’ sense of statehood. Just as Piketty grapples with the fiction of markets as welfaremaximizing, any thinker proposing a solution to the current crisis must also grapple with the
fiction of a European community. It is essential to understand how markets pose a threat to
European democracy but it is becoming increasingly apparent that one must also understand the
shortcomings of the traditional ways of imagining a European demos.
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CONCLUSION

This thesis began by asking why the Eurozone’s highly rules-based nature and thick
regulatory framework produced a suboptimal currency union. The absence of a state to
accompany the currency union largely accounts for the distance between the rules of the
Eurozone and its economic and political performance. Without a state, achieving fiscal solidarity
within the union confronts the added challenge of attaining political legitimacy among its
members and their constituencies. The absence of a European state also reflects shortcomings in
the major theories of political economy. Liberalism envisions a European state but does not
incorporate building political consensus and strengthening the social policy responsibilities of
the state. The socialist conception of a European state also falls short. Establishing a European
social citizenship does not inherently address the deleterious outcomes of the unfettered market.
Similarly, the call for a progressive global tax on capital does not ameliorate the non-economic
political factors threatening the Eurozone. Both theories of political economy present incomplete
or insufficient proposals for a workable political-economic dialectic to match Europe’s presentday climate.
The crisis of the currency union remains one among many uncertainties facing Europe.
Given that the crisis facing Europe extends beyond the economic, does the relationship between
structural shortcomings of the European Union and the shortcomings of political and economic
theory provide a deeper understanding of a variety of Europe’s challenges? In other words, does
the relationship between the currency union and the theories of political economy mirror other
elements of the larger crisis facing Europe? Just as the performance of the currency union defies
its thick regulatory and rules-based framework, does the illegitimate appearance of European
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democracy defy the democratic practices in place? For example, “Why is there still a democratic
deficit in the EU, despite the presence of a directly elected European Parliament that has seen its
powers repeatedly increased over the years?”102 Perhaps the answer to these questions lies in the
mismatch between the Europe envisioned by the drafters of the union’s guiding treaties and a
European solidarity that remains in its nascent stages. The regulatory framework, fiscal rules,
and democratic practices of the EU operate within a European political community that remains
fictitious and symbolic.
A recently published account of European citizenship demonstrates an unexamined
confidence in the success of European integration and its political community. In her book The
Politics of Everyday Europe, Kathleen R. McNamara asserts that everyday European symbols
and practices legitimize the European Union. She argues that the Eurozone’s successful survival
of the financial crisis evidences successful European integration. Unfortunately, McNamara’s
account seems more steeped in idealism than invested in a critical reading of the anti-European
sentiment emboldened by the crisis. Rather than demonstrating the naturalization of European
governance, the Eurozone’s survival illustrates that the founding fathers’ European superstate
remains more far-fetched than ever. McNamara, however, argues that the survival of the crisis
would have been impossible “were it not for ‘decades of slow accumulation of everyday
symbols…[T]he quiet introduction of European ‘labels, mental maps, and narratives’ has built a
European way of interpreting the world.”103 For McNamara, the development of “labels, mental
maps, and narratives” trumps the threat posed by the economic challenges during the crisis years.
Ngaire Woods who reviewed McNamara’s book reminds the Euro-optimist that “the growth of
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the EU has gone hand in hand with demands for autonomy within it.”104 McNarmara’s account
exemplifies the symbolic character of the European political community as imagined by
European federalists. Unfortunately, the optimism of such an account ignores that Europeans do
not seem ready to adopt any kind of superstate.
Not only does the European political community remain more fictional than politically
powerful, the persisting character of the federalist vision seems to lack any kind of tangible
relevance to many Europeans. After meetings in February on the UK’s membership in the
European Union, UK Prime Minister David Cameron celebrated the newly won British
exemption from the commitment to “ever closer union.”105 A recent article from The Economist
called the celebration odd.106 The phrase “ever closer union,” first drafted in 1957 during the
establishment of the European Community, represents a relic of treaty language rather than an
imminent threat to nation-state sovereignty. Any assault the UK exemption from “ever closer
union” poses to the European federalist vision seems inconsequential. “The migrant crisis has
tugged at European unity like nothing before… It is this, rather than a trio of fine words in an
increasingly threadbare document, that should trouble the federalists.”107 The celebration of the
UK opt-out only highlights that the fight over Europe appears distant from the problems plaguing
the Union. “Mr Cameron brag[ged], as he did to the House of Commons this week, that thanks to
his deal Britain will never become part of a ‘European superstate’ that no one is trying to
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build.”108 The enigmatic nature of both the Euro-federalist and Euro-skeptic response highlights
that the debate between European federalists and their opponents remains largely abstract. The
battleground on which these two camps fight appears impertinent to developing a European
ability to respond to the political and economic challenges that confront the Union. So long as
interpreters of Europe’s present-day crises continue to define the political and economic stakes in
symbolic terms, Europe will fail to take the action necessary to remedy its current instability.
In employing socialist and liberal critiques of the Eurozone crisis, this thesis assumes that
establishing a clearer relationship between the state and the economy in Europe proves essential
to confront the Eurozone’s challenges. Because this fundamental relationship between the state
and economy remains ambiguous in the currency union, its crisis held ramifications that
extended far beyond its economic outcomes. In addition to the economic woe produced by the
crisis, the economic collapse exacerbated the political resentment of European citizens and
fueled tensions between Eurozone members. While this thesis grappled with the breakdown of
the relationship between the state and the economy, to better interrogate a viable European
political-economic dialectic requires an investigation into the potential character of a European
state.
The challenge remains reconciling the theoretical propositions of political economy with
the political and economic realities of Europe. The monetary policies of the Eurozone have too
often proven harsh impositions on Eurozone member states beginning to question the advantages
they receive from participating in monetary union. Timothy Garton Ash wonders if the monetary
union’s goal of European unification only serves to undermine the more viable establishment of
a liberal order. He writes, “today it is precisely the forced march to unity–across the ‘bridge too
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far’ of monetary union–that is threatening the very achievement it is supposed to complete.”109
For Ash, the common currency represents a fundamental loss for Europe. By imposing forced
unity onto nation-states, European economic and political union obstructs the possibility for
achieving a less politically tumultuous liberal order in Europe. It seems Europe must confront a
fundamental trade-off: maintain the Eurozone by pursuing a deeper political unity that appears
largely unfeasible given the political disaffection produced by the crisis, or return to nation-state
control of monetary and fiscal policies.
Perhaps there exists a third way. Despite the abundant challenges to the prospect of
establishing a federal European polity and demos, Europe finds itself at a critical juncture that
offers an opportunity for fundamental transformation. Just as the postwar European climate
proved favorable to pursuing new political and economic structures to integrate Europe, perhaps
the present moment provides a context in which to reimagine the European future. Given the
Union’s diversity of membership and Europe’s increasing immigrant and refugee population,
some argue that European leaders must challenge their vision of Europe as monolithic.110 The
federalists will prove no better than the populists if they remain attached to a vision of Europe as
homogenous. A recent study argues that a demos that honors the internal diversity of the union
requires a new model outside the traditional understanding of the demos of the nation-state.111
Creating a European demos not only requires reimagining the ideal vision of Europe as
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monolithic but also requires reimagining how a demos can achieve political power in an
unorthodox political and economic structure such as the European Union and its single currency.
The creation of a European identity remains crucial as one scholar so powerfully called
“democracy an imposition in the absence of identity.”112 European integration requires political
will and does not promise an inevitable European survival. “The European project will continue
so long as Europeans want to participate.”113 The regulatory framework of the EU and its
currency union remain thick but a commitment to European identity formation and developing a
European political consciousness proves unfortunately thin. Perhaps by imagining Europe
outside of the traditional monolithic constructions of the federalist vision, Europe might finally
discover a peaceful ground where it can accomplish the political task of bridging its utopian
ideals and their suboptimal structures.
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